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Executive Summary
Agricultural production in Egypt is virtually fully 
dependent on irrigation. Egypt gets more than 95 
percent of its annual renewable water resources 
from the Nile, and the construction of the High 
Aswan Dam, which was completed in 1971, has 
allowed Egypt to take full advantage of its share of 
Nile flows and increase both cropping intensity and 
size of the cultivated area. Egypt may face signifi­
cant water scarcity within the foreseeable future, 
however, because of the combination of a more or 
less fixed supply of fresh water and increasing 
demands for water owing to population growth 
and reclamation of desert land for agricultural 
production. Because agriculture is the major water 
user in the Egyptian economy, it will be important 
to ensure efficient allocation of irrigation water 
across users and uses.
In situations characterized by water scarcity, irriga­
tion activities may be associated with several types 
of externalities, which in turn have implications for 
water use efficiency. A classic externality is when 
some farmers are able to appropriate as much 
water as they like while the other farmers receive 
only what is left over, resulting in possible drought 
damage to their crops. Another type of externality 
arises because not all water applied to the fields 
ends up being consumed (that is, evapotranspired) 
by the crops. Parts or all of the excess water may 
subsequently be returned to the basin water system 
and become available for another diversion cycle. 
Thus, even if individual farmers use inefficient irri­
gation technologies, this need not result in large 
water losses at the river basin level. Both of these 
externalities are present in various regions in Egypt 
and should be considered when designing policies 
for efficient allocation of irrigation water.
Using water in a socially efficient manner is not 
merely a question of physical efficiency in water 
use. Whereas improving physical efficiency is about 
conserving water by increasing the share of water 
applied that is beneficially used, increasing eco­
nomic efficiency is about maximizing the economic 
value of water use through physical measures and 
allocation of water between water uses and users 
(Cai et al. 2001). Within the cropping sector, eco­
nomic efficiency may be improved by reallocating 
water from low- to high-value cropping activities or 
in some cases by adjusting the choice of 
production technique and using deficit irrigation
(that is, applying less than the full crop water 
requirement).
Many different policy instruments can be used to 
regulate farmers' use of water. The options include 
volumetric taxes and non-volumetric taxes (like 
crop-specific land or output taxes), various types of 
quotas, market-based allocation mechanisms, and 
user-based allocation mechanisms. The degree of 
efficiency that can be achieved in water allocation 
differs across these policy instruments, and so do 
the costs of implementing the policies. Regulating 
farmer water use has not only efficiency implica­
tions, however, but also distributional implications. 
Stakeholders in irrigation water allocation issues 
may be roughly divided into three groups: farmers, 
agents outside agriculture like industries and 
households, and agents in other countries. 
Although efficiency in water allocation policies 
should be an important matter for everyone in 
regions with water scarcity, stakeholders are also 
likely to be highly concerned with the distribu­
tional implications, which depend on the choice of 
policy instrument. All these aspects consequently 
must be taken into account when choosing what 
policy mechanisms to use for allocating scarce irri­
gation water resources in Egypt and elsewhere.
Your assignment is to discuss the efficiency and 
distributional implications of using tax policy 
instruments versus quota policy instruments to 
regulate farmers' use of irrigation water. Then, 
based on the features of the Egyptian economy and 
irrigation system, design a policy strategy for 
regulating farmers' use of irrigation water in Egypt, 
considering economic efficiency aspects, implemen­
tation costs, and stakeholder issues.
Background
Egypt is characterized by an arid climate with very 
limited rainfall. The vast majority of the country is 
desert land, and crop production is virtually fully 
dependent on irrigation. The Nile supplies more 
than 95 percent of Egypt's annual renewable water 
resources, and Egypt is not likely to be able to sig­
nificantly augment its supply of Nile water. Because 
demands for water are meanwhile increasing in 
Egypt, the country may well experience significant 
water scarcity within the foreseeable future.
The major water user in the Egyptian economy, 
agriculture accounts for more than 80 percent of 
total water diversions in Egypt [Mohamed 2001], 
Given the prospect of water scarcity and the agri­
cultural sector's dependence on irrigation, it is im­
portant to consider what policy instruments can be 
used to achieve an efficient allocation of irrigation 
water across farmers and crops. The present case 
will provide an introduction to the issues of effi­
ciency in irrigation water allocation and policies 
targeting farmers' use of irrigation water with par­
ticular reference to the Egyptian irrigation system.
To appreciate the irrigation water policy issues 
facing Egyptian society, it is necessary to first con­
sider the characteristics and complex nature of the 
Egyptian irrigation system. The background section 
will therefore present an overview of the Egyptian 
irrigation system, and the subsequent sections will 
explore policy issues, stakeholders, and policy 
options.
The Egyptian Water Balance
The Nile Delta has been under cultivation for more 
than 5,000 years [Abu-Zeid and Rady 1992], 
Initially irrigation practices were intimately related 
to the natural flow of the Nile, characterized by the 
summer Nile flood, which reaches Egypt in late July 
and recedes in late October. Over time the irriga­
tion system was developed in various ways to 
expand agricultural production possibilities, and 
complete control of the Nile flows was finally 
achieved by the construction of the High Aswan 
Dam, which was completed in 1971. Lake Nasser in 
front of the High Dam has a storage capacity of 
164 billion cubic meters [BCM], amounting to 
almost twice the average annual Nile inflow of 84 
BCM. The High Dam has thus allowed Egypt to 
take full advantage of its share of Nile flows by 
evening out these flows across seasons and between 
years. This water availability in turn has resulted in 
significant increases in both cropping intensity and 
size of the cultivated area.1
The Nile Basin is spread over 10 countries— 
Burundi, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire—and Egypt is 
located downstream from the 9 other Nile Basin
1 The construction of the High Aswan Dam has also 
implied that the fertile sediments, which come with the 
Nile floodwaters, no longer reach the Nile Valley and 
Delta but instead accumulate in Lake Nasser.
countries. So far the use of Nile waters has largely 
been governed by two treaties—one from 1929 
between Egypt and Britain and one from 1959 
between Egypt and Sudan. The 1929 treaty stipu­
lates that no country can engage in projects that 
reduce the amount of water reaching Egypt, and 
the 1959 treaty governs the division of Nile waters 
between Egypt and Sudan [Nkrumah 2004). Under 
the 1959 treaty Egypt and Sudan are respectively 
afforded 55.5 and 18.5 BCM of Nile water annually, 
and evaporation and other water losses from Lake 
Nasser account for the remaining 10 BCM of aver­
age annual Nile flow [FAO 2005).
Egypt has had favorable access to Nile waters 
under the two treaties, and the country therefore 
cannot expect to increase its share of Nile flows to 
cover the rising domestic water demands. In fact, 
upstream countries' desires to use Nile water might 
in the future lower the amount of Nile flows 
reaching Egypt, although cooperation with up­
stream countries may also open up technical solu­
tions to augment Nile flows by reducing seepage 
and evaporation losses.2 Egypt also has some water 
sources unrelated to the Nile, including fossil 
groundwater, and these water sources may provide 
some additional water in the future. Egypt is not 
likely, however, to be able to substantially increase 
its supply of freshwater in the short to medium 
term.
Egyptian water demands, on the other hand, will 
increase noticeably in the coming years. In 2005
2 One option for reducing evaporation losses is the con­
struction of the so-called Blue Nile Reservoirs in Ethiopia. 
These reservoirs would make it possible to shift over­
year storage from Lake Nasser upstream to the upper 
Blue Nile region, where evaporation rates are around 50 
percent of the rates in Egypt and Sudan [Whittington et 
al. 1995). A total of 85 percent of Egypt's water supply 
originates in Ethiopia, however, and the issue of how to 
secure a regular supply of water if the Blue Nile Reser­
voirs were constructed is clearly very important to 
Egypt.
Another project, which also seeks to reduce the 
amount of Nile evaporation losses as well as losses from 
seepage and over-bank flows to swampland, is the so- 
called Jonglei project. This project consists of a series of 
canals designed to drain water from the vast Sudd 
Swamps in southern Sudan. The project was stalled 
because of the instability in the region, and environ­
mental concerns have also been raised in the discussions 
about resuming the project [Whittington et al. 1995; 
Bader 2004).
the Egyptian population had reached 74 million 
people and was growing at an annual rate of 1.9 
percent (World Bank 2007). The growing economy 
and population can be expected to increase the 
demand for water in and of themselves. The impli­
cations of the growing population are further 
compounded, however, by the fact that although 
Egypt is a large country, only a small fraction of 
the land is cultivable. In 1997 agricultural land 
holdings amounted to approximately 8 million 
feddan,3 which corresponds to less than 5 percent 
of the total land area.
The need to feed the growing Egyptian population 
early on led the Egyptian government to adopt a 
strategy of expanding the country's limited agricul­
tural area by reclaiming large amounts of low- 
quality desert land (Hvidt 1998). The Land Master 
Plan of 1986 estimated Egypt's additional reclaim- 
able lands at approximately 3.4 million feddan 
(Hellegers and Perry 2004). According to Hanna 
and Osman (1995), the major objective of the land 
expansion is to increase the production of food, 
feed, and fiber for the growing population, while 
also providing work opportunities and alleviating 
population pressure on the old cities and the en­
suing loss of cropland to urban development. Ac­
cording to the Ministry of Water Resources and 
Irrigation (2005a, 2-31-2-32), "(t]he present agricul­
tural strategy is not based on self-sufficiency but 
on food security, using Egypt's competitive advan­
tages.... Egypt is increasingly in a position to pro­
duce higher-value food crops (e.g. fruits and vege­
tables) and non-food crops (e.g. flax and cotton) 
and trade them to purchase staples and have addi­
tional revenue and employment as well. Maximizing 
national income is therefore considered a more 
reliable approach to food security than self-suffi­
ciency."
Although progress in land reclamation has gener­
ally been much slower than planned (Mohamed 
2001), the land reclamation plans remain very ambi­
tious, aiming to increase agricultural land by more 
than 35 percent compared with the 1997 level 
(Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation 
2005b). These land reclamation plans require sub­
stantial amounts of irrigation water, and if they are 
carried out, Egypt may thus face significant water 
scarcity within the foreseeable future.
3 A feddan is the Egyptian area measurement unit. One 
feddan corresponds to 0.420 hectare (or 1.037 acres) 
(World Bank 1993).
G eneral Features of the Egyptian Irrigation  
System
The Egyptian irrigation system is enormous and 
highly complex. Hvidt (1998, 10) reports that the 
system consisted of "the Aswan High Dam, eight 
main barrages..., approximately 30,000 km of 
public canals, 17,000 km public drains, 80,000 km 
private canals [mesqas) and farm drains, 450,000 
private water lifting devices..., 22,000 public water 
control structures, and 670 large public pumping 
stations for irrigation."
The water delivery canals in the Nile irrigation sys­
tem are classified hierarchically starting with the 
principal canals (which receive water directly from 
the Nile) through the main canals to the branch 
canals and the distributary canals. Mesqas (private 
ditches) receive water from the branch canals or 
the distributary canals and distribute this water 
either directly to the fields or into marwas, which 
are private off-takes from the mesqas conveying 
water to fields located away from the mesqa (Hvidt 
1998). A similar hierarchy exists for the drainage 
system. The state is responsible for the entire irri­
gation and drainage system above mesqa level. The 
mesqas are owned (although not necessarily con­
structed) by the landowners, and they are respon­
sible for maintaining the mesqas and field drains 
(Hvidt 1998).
The state distributes the irrigation water across the 
different segments of the irrigation system. Before 
1992 cropping patterns in Egypt were determined 
by the state. Based on information on cropping 
patterns, the water requirements of each crop, the 
size of planted area, and the soil type, as well as the 
expected conveyance losses and on-farm losses, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation was 
able to calculate the amount of irrigation water 
required for the following year. The request for 
irrigation water would then be sent to the Inter- 
Ministerial Committee on Water Planning, along 
with requests for water from other concerned 
ministries, and a day-by-day plan for releases from 
the High Aswan Dam would be drawn up, including 
the allocation of these releases between the differ­
ent segments of the irrigation system. After 1992 
cropping patterns were liberalized, however, and it 
consequently became difficult to calculate the needs 
for irrigation water and ensure appropriate 
allocations of irrigation water to the different seg­
ments of the irrigation system (Hvidt 1998, 2000).
The problems of allocating water appropriately 
across the different segments of the Egyptian irri­
gation system will be compounded by increasing 
water scarcity because the traditional Egyptian irri­
gation system has not been constructed to handle 
scarcity. According to Hvidt [1998, 9] "up to the 
present day, the system has been characterized by 
water abundance.... The structure, management, 
and technical properties of the [traditional] 
Egyptian irrigation system have been designed and 
operated within a situation of water abundance, 
which means that up to the late 1980s very little 
emphasis was placed on improving the efficiency of 
water use." As the following sections will outline, 
this system has implications for the policy options 
that can be used to promote efficient water use by 
farmers.
Regional Differences in Irrigation Practices
Egypt can be split into two major regions with 
different agricultural and irrigation characteristics. 
The so-called Old Lands encompass the Nile Valley 
and the Nile Delta, which have been cultivated since 
historic times. The so-called New Lands, on the 
other hand, are desert areas that have been 
reclaimed for cultivation since 1953 [Skriver and 
Moeslund 1998], The technical and hydrological 
characteristics of the land and irrigation system 
vary significantly across these regions of Egypt, 
with implications for the irrigation policy issues.
The Old Lands regions are characterized by clayey 
soils, and water is normally applied to the field 
using surface irrigation techniques. These tech­
niques generally have lower application efficiencies 
than the modern and more capital-intensive 
sprinkler and drip irrigation techniques. Conse­
quently, the field irrigation efficiency—defined as 
the fraction of water applied to the field that ends 
up being consumed by the plants—will, other 
things being equal, be lower under surface irriga­
tion techniques than under sprinkler or drip irriga­
tion.4'5 The remaining water, which is not
4 Surface irrigation techniques apply water to the field by 
gravity flow either by flooding the entire field [basin 
irrigation], feeding the water into small channels [fur­
rows], or feeding the water to strips of land [borders]. 
Sprinkler irrigation resembles rainfall because water is 
pumped through a pipe system and then sprayed onto 
the crops through rotating sprinkler heads. Drip irriga­
tion, on the other hand, conveys water to the field 
through a pressurized pipe system from which it drips
consumed by the crops, either ends up in the 
drains or percolates into the ground. In the Nile 
Valley, drainage water is returned to the Nile or to 
the main irrigation canals, whereas in the Delta, 
drainage water is either pumped back into the irri­
gation canals for reuse or pumped into the 
northern lakes or the Mediterranean Sea [FAO 
2005], In most of the Delta and Nile Valley, water 
that percolates into the ground either returns to 
the river or recharges the shallow Nile aquifer from 
where it can be recovered [Keller et al. 1996].6 
Return flows from the Nile Valley are thus virtually 
fully recoverable, and return flows from the Delta 
are partially recoverable.
In the traditional irrigation system in the Old 
Lands, water is delivered to farmers on a rotational 
basis, which is normally applied at the branch 
canals. There are different types of rotations, but 
one typical rotation pattern in Middle Egypt entails 
that water will be on for 5 days and then off for 
the following 10 days. When the water is on in the 
local segment of the irrigation system, each farmer 
simply pumps irrigation water from the open
slowly onto the soil through emitters located close to 
the plants [Brouwer et al. 1988]. According to FAO, 
average field application efficiency for sprinkler and drip 
irrigation is 75 percent and 90 percent, respectively, 
compared with 60 percent for surface irrigation tech­
niques [Brouwer et al. 1989, annex 1], These general field 
application efficiency numbers do not account, however, 
for the effects of different soil types on overall field irri­
gation efficiency. According to Caswell and Zilberman, 
"the fraction of water applied which is actually utilized by 
the plant is a function of the water-holding capacity of 
the soil and the method of water application" [Caswell 
and Zilberman 1986, 799]. Clayey soils, like the ones 
found in the Old Lands, tend to be less water-permeable 
than sandy soils, which are found in large parts of the 
New Lands.
5 Crop water consumption is here equated with crop 
evapotranspiration. Evapotranspiration is defined as the 
"the combination of two separate processes whereby 
water is lost on the one hand from the soil surface by 
evaporation and on the other hand from the crop by 
transpiration" [Allen et al. 1998,1].
Precipitation is generally disregarded in the present 
case study, because it is not a relevant factor for agricul­
tural production in Egypt. It is implicitly assumed that 
the entire water requirement of the crop is covered 
through irrigation.
6 in the northern part of the Delta, drainage and ground- 
water salinity levels are quite high, and these water flows 
are therefore of limited value for reuse [Keller et al. 
1996],
mesqas using a pump that the farmer either owns 
himself or hires when he wants to irrigate. Irriga­
tion water is generally delivered below field level, 
and thus farmers incur pumping costs when irri­
gating. This cost in principle should give them an 
incentive to conserve water, but over time low-cost 
powered pumps have become available, lowering 
the cost of pumping and reducing the time it takes 
to pump a given amount of water [Hvidt 1998; 
Abu-Zeid 1995; Hellegers and Perry 2004],
The rotational irrigation system suffers from a 
number of drawbacks. The system is ill suited for 
cultivation of short-rooted crops like vegetables, 
which require more frequent irrigation, and it is 
very difficult to secure an even distribution of 
water along the canals, which in turn results in 
unequal water deliveries and so-called tail-end 
problems (see the next section]. Inadequate 
deliveries of water have led many farmers to mani­
pulate the system in various ways to deliver larger 
amounts of water. In some locations, the rotation 
schedule is also observed somewhat loosely, making 
it difficult to predict when irrigation water will be 
available. Farmers may thus have rather limited 
water control, which in turn leads them to adopt 
inefficient irrigation practices like irrigating too 
soon and applying too much water. According to 
Hvidt (1998], studies have shown that farmers have 
applied 50 percent to 250 percent more water than 
required by the crops and for the purpose of 
leaching.7 In addition to these problems of the 
rotation system, the structures of the irrigation 
system are also old and deteriorating, and farmers 
also increasingly face water pollution problems 
(Hvidt 1998; Hellegers and Perry 2004],
To address the shortcomings of the traditional irri­
gation system as well as the predicted demands of 
the 21st century, Egypt has adopted the Irrigation 
Improvement Project (IIP], The IIP calls for 
improving about 3.5 million feddan (of which some 
70 percent are located in the Delta] by the year 
2017 (Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation 
2005a], Given the speed of implementation, how­
ever, the total area covered by IIP in 2017 is likely 
to be somewhat smaller.
The purpose of the technological package 
implemented under the IIP is to ensure efficient
7 Leaching here refers to the practice of applying extra 
irrigation water in order to prevent salts from building 
up in the soil (that is, salinity control].
water use and optimal crop production by giving 
farmers the flexibility to irrigate at the time, rate, 
and duration required by their crops. The IIP pack­
age includes both technical and social changes to 
the irrigation system. The fundamental change 
introduced by the IIP is the replacement of individ­
ual farmer pumping at multiple points along the 
mesqa with collective pumping at a single point. To 
this end, the IIP introduces continuous flow in 
branch and distributary canals, high-level mesqas 
with single point lifting, water user associations 
(WUAs], downstream control/demand irrigation, 
and an Irrigation Advisory Service (IAS] (Hvidt 
1998],
The aim of replacing the rotational operation of 
the branch and distributary canals with continuous 
flow is to enable farmers to irrigate according to 
the water needs of their crops. Continuous flow 
only implies continuous availability of water, how­
ever—not increased amounts of water. Each com­
mand area will still receive the same amount of 
water each month as it did under the old rotational 
system. The old mesqas below field level are being 
replaced by elevated concrete-lined mesqas. Instead 
of the previous system in which individual farmers 
pumped water at multiple points along the old 
mesqas, water is pumped from a single point at the 
branch canal into the elevated mesqa and then 
flows by gravity within the mesqa to the field out­
lets. Only two or three farmers will typically be 
able to take water at the same time. Water user 
associations will schedule irrigation flows among 
the different farmers (Hvidt 1998; Hellegers and 
Perry 2004],
Hellegers and Perry (2004] point out, however, 
that the new IIP system is not problem free. Intro­
ducing pumps at the head of mesqas without 
ensuring sufficient capacity in the distributary 
canals may simply move the supply constraint up­
stream to the distributary canals. Furthermore, 
there is some evidence to suggest that farmers have 
found the new pumps at the head of the mesqas 
unreliable. Many have therefore resorted to instal­
ling their own pumps and drawing water directly 
from the distributary canals, thus circumventing 
the new mesqas. The construction standards for 
the new elevated mesqas have also been poor, and 
failures in the aboveground system are unfortu­
nately much more serious than failures in the tradi­
tional below-ground system. Finally, there is the 
issue of volumetric measurement of water
allocations, which was not feasible under the tradi­
tional system owing to the individual multipoint 
pumping system. The new system is in principle 
capable of measuring the amount of water farmers 
pump into the elevated mesqa [thanks to the collec­
tive single-point pumping mechanism], but this 
often does not work, and volumetric water alloca­
tion can therefore not yet be used to balance 
supply and demand [Hellegers and Perry 2004],
As mentioned, the land and irrigation characteris­
tics of the New Lands differ substantially from 
those of the Old Lands. The soils in the New Lands 
are typically sandy or calcareous and poor in 
organic matter. The New Lands are located at the 
ends of the irrigation system and mostly outside 
the Nile's drainage basin, and farmers in the New 
Lands are required by law to use either sprinkler or 
drip irrigation [FAO 2005; Hellegers and Perry 
2004). Unlike surface irrigation, sprinkler and drip 
irrigation typically require a continuous supply of 
water. The modern irrigation system in the New 
Lands implies that metering water at the point of 
delivery is in principle possible [Abu-Zeid and Rady 
1992).
The New Lands also differ from the Old Lands with 
respect to yields, crop water requirements, and 
cropping patterns. Crop yields tend to be substan­
tially lower in the New Lands than in the Old 
Lands. According to the Ministry of Water 
Resources and Irrigation [2005a, 2-31), "this is 
expected to improve with time, but initially, newly 
reclaimed lands do not achieve the yields of the 
older lands." Crop water consumption rates are in 
many cases also higher in the New Lands 
[Mohamed 2001, appendix). In 1997/98, however, 
the average value of production per area unit was 
higher in the New Lands than in the Old Lands, 
because the higher-value fruit and vegetable crops 
make up a significantly larger share of the culti­
vated area in the New Lands than in the Old Lands 
[Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation 
2005a).
Policy Issues
Agriculture is, as previously outlined, the major 
water user in the Egyptian economy. As water 
scarcity becomes more pronounced, it will become 
even more important to ensure efficient use of 
irrigation water.
Externalities and Different Measures of 
Water Use Efficiency
There are many aspects to the notion of using irri­
gation water efficiently. One of the important 
issues is how to ensure an efficient allocation of 
water resources across different farmers. Although 
irrigation water is an important input in agricultural 
production in developing countries, there is often 
no market for irrigation water. In some cases, the 
state or groups of water users may have formu­
lated water allocation policies or mechanisms them­
selves to compensate for the missing water market, 
but these water allocation policies are not neces­
sarily designed to ensure an efficient allocation of 
irrigation water across users.
If the right quantities of water were always available 
at the right time, in the right place, and with the 
right quality, there would be no need for markets 
or other types of mechanisms to regulate the allo­
cation of water. When some kind of water scarcity 
prevails, however, whether it is a global, local, or 
seasonal phenomenon, the lack of mechanisms for 
allocating water efficiently between competing uses 
will result in inefficient use of water resources and 
water users' imposition of externalities on each 
other. A classic example of externalities in irriga­
tion is the so-called head-end-tail-end problem, 
where farmers at the head of the system can 
appropriate as much water as they like, whereas 
farmers in the tails of the system receive only what 
is left over, resulting in possible drought damage to 
their crops [Perry et al. 1997). In Egypt there is 
ample scope for farmers to impose these kinds of 
negative externalities on each other owing to the 
lack of mechanisms for efficiently regulating indi­
vidual farmers' appropriation of water. As outlined 
in the previous section, although the centralized 
water allocation system does imply a kind of quota 
scheme for allocating water between different seg­
ments of the irrigation system, the traditional irri­
gation infrastructure in the Old Lands has not 
allowed for a quota scheme to be implemented at 
the individual farmer level.
This type of externality related to farmers' water 
diversions can typically be attributed to ill-defined 
[or in some cases poorly enforced) property rights 
over irrigation water. It is well known from the 
general literature on externalities that inefficiencies 
from externalities can be alleviated through a 
variety of policy instruments, including taxes, 
quotas, or the establishment of some sort of
bargaining or market mechanism. As noted by 
Turner et al. (2004], all these instruments imply 
the explicit or implicit assignment or modification 
of the property rights to the water resource. The 
inefficiencies of the water diversion externality are 
thus alleviated by explicitly or implicitly addressing 
the underlying cause of the externality.
Another aspect of efficient use of irrigation water 
is to minimize nonbeneficial losses of this resource. 
Looking at the individual farmer's use of water, 
substantial amounts of water may be lost through 
the use of inefficient irrigation technologies. As 
already mentioned, surface irrigation techniques 
tend to generate lower field irrigation efficiency 
than modern sprinkler and drip irrigation tech­
nologies. Surface irrigation techniques may there­
fore, other things being equal, result in the loss of 
a higher fraction of water applied than sprinkler 
and drip irrigation.
What matters from society's point of view, how­
ever, is not necessarily the irrigation efficiency of 
the individual farmer. As noted by Perry et al. 
(1997, 10], "(o]ne of the most important, yet least 
appreciated, facts about water is that in a basin, a 
substantial amount of it is recycled." In irrigated 
agriculture the recycling of water stems from the 
fact that the part of the applied water that is not 
consumed may be returned to the basin water sys­
tem. This recycling occurs if drainage water is 
channeled back to the main water source or irriga­
tion canals or if water that percolates into the 
ground ends up in aquifers from where it can be 
retrieved. What matters from a social efficiency 
point of view is thus not necessarily how much 
water is applied to the field, but rather how much 
water is actually consumed by the plants or other­
wise irretrievably lost, because this is the amount of 
water that is in fact taken out of the system.8 The 
recoverable return flows thus constitute another 
type of externality arising from irrigation activities 
when they become available for yet another diver­
sion cycle "at another time, another place, and at 
another quality" (Perry et al. 1997, 10],
In most of the Old Lands in Egypt, drainage water 
is returned to the Nile or the irrigation canals and 
most percolation flows end up in aquifers from 
where they can be retrieved. Although farmers in
8 The quality of the return flows will typically be lower, 
however, than the quality of the water initially applied 
(see the next section].
these areas use a less efficient irrigation technique, 
this consequently does not result in large water 
losses at the basin level. In the New Lands, on the 
other hand, water that percolates into the ground 
is generally lost. It is therefore important to use 
the more efficient irrigation techniques in these 
areas, as mandated by law. Another factor that 
tends to reduce potential water losses in the Old 
Lands while increasing them in the New Lands is 
soil type. The clayey soils in the Old Lands are less 
water permeable than the sandy soils in the New 
Lands.9
Although the concept of water system (or basin] 
efficiency is important, it also has its limitations 
from an economic point of view, because it relates 
only to the physical quantities of water and conse­
quently does not address the issue of whether 
water is being used in the most economically 
productive way. Although improving physical effi­
ciency is about conserving water by increasing the 
fraction of water applied that is beneficially used, 
increasing economic efficiency is about maximizing 
the economic value of water use through physical 
measures and allocation (or reallocation] of water 
between water uses and users (Cai et al. 2001],
The differences in the value of water in alternative 
uses can be captured by the concept of water 
productivity. Water productivity can be increased 
either by increasing the amount of a given output 
per input unit of water or by reallocating water 
from lower- to higher-value production either 
within the agricultural sector or between sectors 
(Molden and de Fraiture 2000], Within the crop­
ping sector, economic efficiency may thus be 
improved by reallocating water from low- to high- 
value cropping activities (Keller et al. 1996], Eco­
nomic efficiency can also be improved by adjusting 
the choice of production technique, as in some 
situations it may be more efficient to produce 
crops by using less than the full crop water 
requirement (that is, water-stressing the crops 
through deficit irrigation] even though this practice 
also reduces crop yields. To maximize the social 
economic efficiency of water, however, the use of
9 Water losses also occur from the water conveyance and 
distribution system. Such water losses include both seep­
age and nonbeneficial evaporation. The former types of 
water losses may be recoverable, however, if the seeping 
water ends up in an accessible aquifer. There are also 
substantial evaporation losses from Lake Nasser behind 
the High Aswan Dam.
water must be evaluated using social prices rather 
than market prices, because the latter may not 
reflect the true social costs and benefits. Water use 
can then be retargeted to the activities producing 
the highest socioeconomic returns through the 
introduction of various price and nonprice 
"demand management" measures [see Mohamed 
2001],
Water Quality and Cost Recovery
The discussion of water scarcity implications has so 
far focused on water quantity. Water scarcity is not 
merely an issue of quantity, however, but also an 
issue of quality, because severe deterioration in 
water quality may render water unusable. Every 
time water is diverted and used for irrigation, the 
quality of the resulting return flows will be lower 
than the quality of the water that was applied 
owing to increased concentration of salts and pol­
lutants. Thus, on its way from the High Aswan 
Dam to the Mediterranean Sea, the salt and pollu­
tion concentration of the Nile increases. Mohamed 
[2001] cites a study from 1995, however, that sug­
gests that polluted spots were still localized in the 
Nile system and states that water quality was still 
adequate for most uses upstream from the Delta. 
Throughout the Delta, severe water pollution is 
found downstream from large communities and 
industrial cities [Mohamed 2001].
Another issue, which is connected to the notion of 
efficiency in water use, is the degree to which the 
costs of delivering the water are covered and car­
ried by the appropriate agents. Traditionally the 
costs of operating and managing the irrigation and 
drainage system, as well as investments and rehabili­
tation costs, have been borne by the Ministry of 
Water Resources and Irrigation. Apart from the 
cost of pumping water onto their fields, farmers 
have not paid directly for their irrigation water, but 
they do pay land taxes, which cover part of the 
cost of the irrigation system.10 These land taxes, 
however, do not depend on crop type or the
10 Some parts of the New Lands are irrigated by ground- 
water, and according to a World Bank study [2001] 
farmers pay the full cost of groundwater abstraction in 
the New Lands. Farmers also repay on-farm investments 
that are part government programs [like the Irrigation 
Improvement Project], but there is an extensive grace 
period for repayment of these investments, which 
amount to a subsidy [Ministry of Water Resources and 
Irrigation 2005a],
amount of water used [Hellegers and Perry 2004], 
Before the liberalization of agricultural policies in 
the 1990s, farmers were also taxed indirectly 
through the mandatory sales of agricultural pro­
duce to the state at low prices, but after liberaliza­
tion farmers are rather free to determine what to 
grow and whom to sell it to [Ministry of Water 
Resources and Irrigation 2005a; Hvidt 1998], 
Because the land taxes do not cover all the costs of 
delivering irrigation water and maintaining the irri­
gation and drainage system, the state must cover 
these expenses through other revenue sources. The 
provision of irrigation water is thus in effect subsi­
dized, which tends to encourage socially inefficient 
use of this resource.
Stakeholders and Policy Options
Water is a resource that affects everyone in society 
on a daily basis. The group of stakeholders in water 
allocation issues thus ultimately includes the whole 
society. Furthermore, because water flows across 
national borders, parties outside the country in 
question may also be considered stakeholders to 
the extent that they are influenced by the water 
allocation policies. Efficiency in water allocation 
should thus be an important matter for virtually 
everyone in regions where water scarcity prevails. 
Many stakeholders, however, are more likely to 
care about the income and distributional conse­
quences of water allocation policy instruments.
The group of agents that is most directly influ­
enced by the choice of irrigation water allocation 
policies consists of Egyptian farmers. Using tax 
policy instruments to regulate farmers' use of water 
will, other things being equal, have a negative im­
pact on farmers' income unless the tax revenue is 
somehow returned to the farmers. Depending on 
the degree of water scarcity and hence the degree 
to which farmers' water use must be curtailed, the 
reductions in farmer incomes may be substantial. 
According to a study by Lofgren on water cost 
recovery and water scarcity in Egypt, reducing 
farmers' water use by 15 percent through water 
charges would lead to a 22 percent reduction in net 
farm incomes [Lofgren 1996],
Although it seems reasonable to assume that 
farmers' net income will be reduced if water use is 
regulated through a tax mechanism, the distribu­
tional implications of water-regulating policies for
groups of farmers are not a priori clear. Certain 
policy schemes may inadvertently result in redistri­
bution between different regions of the country. 
This would be the case, for instance, if farmer 
water use were to be regulated through a single set 
of crop-specific land taxes based on the average 
national water consumption rates for each crop. 
Such a tax scheme would tend to favor the New 
Lands at the expense of the Old Lands to the 
extent that crop water consumption rates are 
higher in the New Lands than in the Old Lands 
(Gersfelt 2007)." If, on the other hand, tax rates 
were regionalized, it would alleviate these types of 
regional redistribution issues.
Farmers may also be heterogeneous within regions, 
differing, for instance, with respect to soil type, 
degree of land leveling, access to input and output 
markets, managerial skills, and water-regulating 
policy may result in redistributions between 
farmers. This is not to say that redistributions are 
necessarily negative—in fact, they may be desirable 
from society's point of view. Regardless of social 
desirability, however, redistributions will often meet 
with political opposition, which may make it diffi­
cult to implement the necessary reforms of the 
water allocation mechanism.
Cultural and religious factors may also have impli­
cations for whether it will be possible to implement 
a given set of water-regulating policies. Hellegers 
and Perry (2004) report that although it is in prin­
ciple acceptable to charge for the service of pro­
viding water in Egypt, charging for irrigation water 
itself is not acceptable, which makes volumetric 
water charges a contentious issue. It is thus not 
surprising that "charging agriculture for water and 
water services is ... a politically sensitive issue in 
Egypt" (Hellegers and Perry 2004, 41). According 
to Gutner (1999), there has generally been a legacy 
of government caution toward economic reforms 
in Egypt since the 1977 riots, which were sparked 
by cuts in the food subsidy program, which led to 
high, sharp price increases that were perceived to 
be inequitable. Since then, however, the govern­
ment has succeeded in reforming the food subsidy 
program by adopting a gradual approach. In the 
1990s the Egyptian government also succeeded in 
reforming land rent legislation, which had 1
1 Regional differences in field irrigation efficiency and 
return flow recoverability would also affect the distribu­
tional implications for the different regions (see Gersfelt 
2007).
protected and favored tenants by keeping land 
rents much lower than market value. Over the 
course of a five-year period, land rents were raised 
from 7 times the land tax to 22 times, and since 
October 1997 farm tenancy and land rents have 
been determined by the market (Nassar and 
Mansour 2003). It is consequently possible to 
implement such types of reforms in Egypt, pro­
vided it is done in a gradual manner. Furthermore, 
attitudes toward water pricing might also slowly 
start to change as water becomes scarcer and the 
need for a transparent and efficient water allocation 
mechanism becomes more evident.
One alternative to using tax policy instruments to 
regulate farmers' water use is to use quotas, which 
could be allocated to farmers free of charge. If 
farmers are highly heterogeneous, however, it may 
be quite costly to determine the socially optimal 
farmer-specific quotas. Furthermore, to be accepted 
by farmers, the quota assignment process would 
probably have to be not only transparent, but also 
based on criteria perceived to be fair. Quotas by 
themselves would also not generate the revenue to 
cover the part of the operation and maintenance 
costs for the system that the state is currently sub­
sidizing. The revenue from tax policy instruments, 
on the other hand, could be used to cover these 
expenses, and any remaining revenue could in prin­
ciple be channeled back to the farmers and the 
rural community.
Agents outside of agriculture like industries or 
households are also stakeholders in the national 
Egyptian water economy. In most countries, how­
ever, municipal and domestic water needs, as well as 
industrial and commercial water needs, are given 
priority over agricultural water needs (Perry et al. 
1997), and this is also the case in Egypt. Water use 
by these nonagricultural agents may nonetheless 
still be affected by salts and pollutants in the return 
flows from agriculture. Moreover, unless the agri­
cultural sector is made to bear its full share of the 
costs of operating and maintaining the irrigation 
system, these other sectors will in effect subsidize 
the irrigation system.
Agents outside of Egypt may also be stakeholders 
in the Egyptian national water economy. Egypt is 
the last country before the Nile reaches the 
Mediterranean Sea, so no countries are located 
downstream the Nile from Egypt. As already men­
tioned, however, upstream countries are also
indirectly affected by Egypt's water policies. Under 
the 1929 and 1959 treaties, Egypt has assumed the 
right to veto upstream projects that would 
adversely affect its water interests (Nkrumah 
2004). The upstream countries—with the excep­
tion of Ethiopia—were all colonies of European 
powers at the time the 1929 treaty was established, 
and they now strongly object to the treaty and 
renounce it as invalid. Egypt, on the other hand, 
has repeatedly stated that a unilateral change in this 
treaty would amount to a breach of international 
law, and upper riparian countries may fear—not 
without grounds—that Egypt would use military 
power to secure control of Nile water. Discussions 
on these transboundary water-sharing issues are 
now taking place within the so-called Nile Basin 
Initiative, which includes the different Nile basin 
countries (Nkrumah 2004). Consequently, how 
Egypt chooses to address its domestic water chal­
lenge may affect the upstream countries with 
respect to the options and terms for future Nile 
Basin water agreements.
Policy Instruments
The policy instruments that can be used to regulate 
farmers' use of water include volumetric water 
taxes, non-volumetric taxes, quotas, market-based 
allocation mechanisms, and user-based allocation 
mechanisms (Johansson et al. 2002).
Volumetric water taxing implies that a tax is placed 
on the amount of water the farmer diverts for irri­
gating his fields, which in effect places a direct 
price on the farmer's water diversion. This 
approach can involve a single tax rate on water 
diversions or it can take more sophisticated forms, 
such as tiered pricing, where the water tax rate 
varies according to the amount of water diverted, 
or two-part tariff pricing, where the farmer pays a 
constant marginal price per unit of irrigation water 
purchased as well as a fixed annual or admission 
charge for the right to purchase water (Tsur and 
Dinar 1997).
Non-volumetric taxes seek to regulate a farmer's 
use of water by taxing other variables, which are 
somehow correlated with the farmer's use of water, 
and hence indirectly pricing the farmer's use of 
water. Possible non-volumetric taxes for regulating 
irrigation water usage include land taxes or output
taxes.12 The simplest form a land tax scheme can 
take is a uniform per area charge. Such a scheme 
can influence the farmer's use of water only 
through his decision about how large an area to 
irrigate. To affect the farmer's cropping pattern 
decision, land taxes (and also output taxes) can be 
made crop-specific so that they better target the 
differences in water requirements across crops.
Instead of using tax instruments, it is also possible 
to regulate farmers' water use through quotas. The 
most direct approach is to assign individual water 
diversion quotas to farmers, but the quota could in 
principle also relate to land use or output quanti­
ties. If a water quota or some other measure of 
farmer water entitlement is made tradable, water 
markets can be established and water can then be 
allocated through the market mechanism. Finally, 
water can also be allocated through user-based allo­
cation mechanisms, which—as the name suggests— 
entail that the water users allocate the water among 
themselves. User-based allocation mechanisms 
require collective action institutions that have the 
authority to make decisions on water rights (Dinar 
et al. 1997).
The degree of efficiency that can be achieved in 
water allocation differs across these instruments. 
The following discussion will focus on the tax 
policy instruments, but many of these arguments 
also apply to the quota versions of these instru­
ments.
A volumetric water tax targets the amount of 
water the farmer applies to the field. As outlined 
earlier, however, what matters from a social effi­
ciency point of view is the amount of water con­
sumed or irretrievably lost in the course of irriga­
tion. When return flows are partially recoverable, 
volumetric water taxes will not be able to take ac­
count of crop-specific differences in field irrigation 
efficiency in a socially efficient way. The field irriga­
tion efficiency would typically differ between rice 
and other crops because traditional rice production 
requires extra water for soaking the paddy fields.
12 Non-volumetric taxes can also include taxes on other 
inputs than land. The implications of using taxes on 
other inputs to affect farmers' use of water have been 
studied by He (2004). Using agricultural sector models 
for Egypt and Morocco, she analyses the effect of using 
taxes on fertilizers, pesticides, and energy, as well as taxes 
on output, compared with the effect of using volumetric 
water pricing.
When return flows are partially or fully recovera­
ble, a volumetric water tax scheme will therefore 
result in too heavy taxation of rice production, 
from a social efficiency point of view. If return 
flows are not recoverable, on the other hand, 
volumetric water taxes will in principle provide the 
socially optimal incentives for farmers' cropping 
pattern decisions.
Unlike volumetric water taxes, crop-specific land 
taxes would be able to account for crop-specific 
field irrigation efficiencies even when return flows 
are recoverable. Once the decision on cropping 
pattern has been made, however, crop-specific land 
taxes can no longer affect the farmer's use of 
water, because the marginal cost of applying more 
water to the same area is zero. Crop-specific land 
taxes will thus not induce farmers to adopt deficit- 
irrigation of the crop, which in some cases may be 
efficient from society's point of view, nor will they 
induce farmers to avoid misuse or overuse of 
water. In the case of crop-specific output taxes, 
there is a relationship between tax payments and 
water use, because yields tend to increase when 
water application increases [except in the case of 
overirrigation]. It is not given, however, that a 
crop-specific output tax will lead the farmer to 
choose the socially optimal water-yield production 
technique (Gersfelt 2007],
In addition to these issues of how efficiently the 
different tax instruments can allocate water across 
crops and water-yield production techniques, there 
is also the issue of whether the policy instruments 
should be regionalized to capture regional differ­
ences in, for instance, crop water consumption 
rates, crop yields, field irrigation efficiency, and 
return flow recoverability, because basing tax rates 
on national averages for such variables can result in 
socially suboptimal allocation of water across 
regions (Gersfelt 2007],
The policy instruments differ not only in terms of 
their water allocation efficiency properties, but also 
in terms of their implementation costs. Although a 
given policy instrument may achieve a high degree 
of water allocation efficiency, high implementation 
costs may imply that this is not the most socially 
efficient choice of policy instrument for regulating 
farmers' use of irrigation water. Volumetric water 
taxes would require the ability to meter individual 
farmers' water diversions. As mentioned, this is not 
yet possible in the traditional irrigation system in
the Old Lands, but in the future it may become 
possible in the areas covered by the IIP. Upgrading 
the entire irrigation infrastructure to allow for 
metering will require substantial investments, how­
ever, which would not only be costly, but also take 
a number of years to implement. Furthermore, 
even if meters are installed, it may be difficult to 
ensure metering of all farmers' water diversions. 
The reason is that if irrigation water is delivered in 
open canals, as is generally the case in Egypt, it 
may be difficult to prevent farmers located next to 
these canals from circumventing the meters by 
pumping the water straight from the canals and 
dodging the tax payments. This problem does not 
affect non-volumetric instruments like land taxes, 
because the tax in this case is levied on land use 
rather than on water.
In reality, implementing a volumetric water pricing 
system is also not simply a matter of getting the 
technology in place for metering farmers' water 
diversions. A regulatory framework must also be 
established, with procedures for measuring the 
amount of water delivered as well as procedures for 
partial deliveries, missed deliveries, excess deliveries, 
late deliveries, polluted deliveries, and so on. An 
administrative bureaucracy must be established to 
collect data on water deliveries to farmers and 
carry out the billing (Perry 2001], The establish­
ment of such regulatory and administrative frame­
works may be a significant barrier to the implemen­
tation of water policies in countries where regula­
tory structures and traditions are not yet strong 
and well developed.
Implementation of the non-volumetric policy 
instrument of crop-specific land taxes does not 
necessitate major investments in physical structures. 
Nonetheless, information must be collected on 
each farmer's allocation of land to different crops. 
Although collecting such information is not cost 
free, the implementation costs for land taxes are 
often deemed to be lower than the implementation 
costs for many of the other water policy instru­
ments.
Implementing an output tax scheme requires 
information on output levels for each farmer. The 
cost of measuring these output levels will depend in 
part on the crop-marketing channels. In the special 
cases where the entire crop is marketed through a 
central state trading enterprise, measuring the level 
of output may be relatively inexpensive, resulting in
low implementation costs. On the other hand, if 
some or all of the crop is either marketed through 
local informal markets or used for home consump­
tion, then the costs of implementing an output 
pricing scheme can be very high. According to 
Tsur and Dinar, "the measurement of output can 
be as formidable as that of water" and examples of 
output pricing as a means for pricing water are rare 
[Tsur and Dinar 1997, 245].
As the preceding section has shown, each policy 
instrument has its pros and cons in terms of both 
efficiency and implementation costs. These aspects 
must all be considered and weighed against each 
other in the effort to  design the most socially effi­
cient policy schemes for regulating farmers' use of 
irrigation water.
Assignment
Your assignment is to  discuss the efficiency and 
distributional implications of using tax policy 
instruments versus quota policy instruments to 
regulate farmers' use of irrigation water. Then, 
based on the features of the Egyptian economy and 
irrigation system, design a policy strategy for 
regulating farmers' use of irrigation water in Egypt, 
considering economic efficiency aspects, implemen­
tation costs, and stakeholder issues.
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